[16] In R. v. Beauchamp (1953), 16 C.R. 270, the Ontario Court of Appeal stated the standard for careless driving is a constantly shifting one which depends on the road, visibility, weather and traffic conditions as well as other conditions which an ordinary driver would take into consideration.
In the matter at bar, clearly the visibility was limited by the fog. Nonetheless, Officer Nelson acknowledged that his visibility extended to 50 metres which provided a limited range of view for Ms Richards. While the road was wet from the fog, no evidence suggested Ms Richards could not stop due to road conditions. No evidence was led there were adverse traffic conditions. Officer Nelson testified that he was travelling at 60 kph and Ms Richards at approximately 40 kph. Therefore, Ms Richards was driving at a reasonable speed for the conditions of limited visibility and wet roads which existed that night. In my view, it cannot be said that she was driving "without due care and attention or without reasonable consideration for other persons using the highway".
[17] In R. v. Ereddia, [2006] O.J. No. 3421 (OCJ), Justice Fairgrieve also commented on the standards for a conviction of careless driving. He stated:
(6) The offence of "driving carelessly", created by s. 130 of the Highway Traffic Act, is defined as driving on a highway "without due care and attention or without reasonable consideration for other persons using the highway". The law has been clear for decades that in order to make out the offence under s. 130, the driving must be of such a nature that it amounts to a breach of one's duty to the public and is deserving of punishment: see R. v. Beauchamp (1953), 16 C.R. 270 at p. 278 (Ont. C.A.). A driver is not held to a standard of perfection, and a mere error of judgment is not necessarily sufficient to establish the offence: see R. v. Wilson (1971), 1 C.C.C. (2d) 466 (Ont. C.A.). Careless driving, generally speaking, requires proof of a departure from the standard of care that a reasonably prudent driver would have exercised in the circumstances, and normally involves, I would think, conduct that includes other less serious Highway Traffic Act infractions.
(7) Mr. Klaiman, counsel for the appellant, also referred in his factum to the pertinent judgment of Killeen Co. Ct. J. in R. v. Namink, [1979] O.J. No. 317 (QL), where, at para. 10, the learned County Court judge stated as follows:
It is trite to say that this is a quasi-criminal charge, and that to make out a charge under this section the evidence must bespeak conduct deserving punishment in the way of a conviction under this section of our Highway Traffic Act. Mere momentary inattention, or a simple kind of error of judgment, does not bespeak the kind of conduct over which the net of this section is cast."