I was doing between 40-50 in a posted 50.
My Medical condition was determined to be an isolated incident called VasoVagul, I had countless tests done immediate;y after the accident and and was required to Have a Medical form sent into the Ministry so that they could determine if I could continue to drive and it was accepted by the Ministry.
I never experienced anything like this before and am in perfect health now and prior to the Accident.
The condition is caused from sudden stress and lack of nutrients, ( i was running around that day).
I did not Drive with Undue Care and attention or without reasonable consideration for others.
It was not marked pre-emptry by the JP.
Again NO Prior History, perfect Health currently and an Isolated Incident.
If you look at R v Arignello where the defendants conviction was overturned in Appeal court, he had a bad coughing incident and was coughing the whole day, sweating and as he was driving he began coughing violently for a few seconds and had a fainting spell and went off the road and killed a pedestrian who was retrieving her mail at the side of the road.
His License was not revoked.... It was a moment of inadvertance, his eyes close for a few seconds and it happened, it was uncontrollable.
R v Beauchamp:
To support a charge under s. 29(1) of The Highway Traffic Act, the evidence must be such as to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused drove in the manner prohibited by the subsection, namely, without
due care and attention or without reasonable consideration for others. The standard of care and skill to be
applied has been long established and is not that of perfection. It is, I think, correctly stated in Mazengarb,
op cit., at pp. 176-7, as follows:
"The law does not require of any driver that he should exhibit 'perfect nerve and presence of mind,
enabling him to do the best thing possible.' It does not expect men to be more than ordinary men. Drivers
of vehicles cannot be required to regulate their driving as if in constant fear that other drivers who are under
observation, and apparently acting reasonably and properly, may possibly act at a critical moment in
disregard of the safety of themselves and other users of the road.
"But the law does insist upon a reasonable amount of skill in the handling of a vehicle which is a potential
source of danger to other users of the road. ... The question always is 'What would an ordinary prudent
person in the position of the plaintiff have done in relation to the event complained of?'" (Pollock on Torts
uses the term "average man".)
In this case, and in some of the cases to which I have referred, evidence has been admitted to show that
the accused had a good record as a careful driver. Such evidence is not relevant on the issue of guilt or
innocence. As was said by Lord Hewart C.J. in McCrone v. Riding, supra, at p. 158: "That standard is an
objective standard, impersonal and universal, fixed in relation to the safety of other users of the highway. It
is in no way related to the degree of proficiency or degree of experience attained by the individual driver."
There is a further important element that must also be considered, namely, that the conduct must be of
such a nature that it can be considered a breach of duty to the public and deserving of punishment. This
further step must be taken even if it is found that the conduct of the accused falls below the standard set out
in the preceding paragraphs. This principle may be somewhat difficult to apply, but I think it might be
illustrated by the common example of a motorist attempting to park at the curb in a space between two other
parked vehicles. Frequently one or other of the parked vehicles is bumped in the process. Damage seldom
arises, because cars are equipped with bumpers, but if damage were caused it might well give rise to a civil
action for damages, but it could hardly be said to be such a lack of care or attention as would be considered
to be deserving of punishment as a crime or quasi-crime.
Applying these principles to the facts of this case, I am of the opinion that the appellant is right in his
submission that there is no evidence to justify a conviction. The uncontradicted evidence is that the
appellant looked while coming out of the garage and there was then no motor car parked on the street. He
looked through the back window of the bus and also in the rear-view mirror before backing and then backed
very slowly. He did not see the parked car, apparently because of the length of his vehicle, the position of
his rear window and the relative position of the car at that time. It was 7 a.m. in a small town, when he
might reasonably have anticipated that a car would not drive up behind his bus into a position where it could
not be seen through his rear window in the very brief period of time that elapsed between his comming out
of the garage and his backing up. It was clearly not such a lack of care in these circumstances as could be
considered deserving of punishment. It is perhaps unnecessary to add that had the accident occurred during
a busy time of the day, when traffic might reasonably have been expected, the result might have been
different; nor do I entend to suggest that his conduct was not such as might give rise to civil liability.
The second ground of appeal is that the charge is bad for duplicity. Since this point was not raised in
either of the Courts below, I do not think we should now permit it to be raised in this Court.
Leave to appeal should therefore be granted, the appeal should be allowed and the conviction should be
quashed, the fine and any costs paid by the appellant in the Courts below to be returned to him forthwith.